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Canonical Markdown source · Oct 20, 2018

AI agent review-chain binding — technical recommendation

technical-recommendations/ai-agent-review-chain-binding-2026-08-25.md · 42 lines · SHA-256 c05c714db73d

Impact summary

Independent-review completion now requires an unbroken public evidence chain:

registered readiness, semantically verified assignment, and aggregate review must

agree on surface, packet hash, reviewer count, and observation count. A valid but

unrelated aggregate cannot advance readiness. Canonical counts remain 4 provider

surfaces, 2 assignments, 0 reviews, 2 retirements, and 0 proven advantages.

Ranked findings

  1. High — human returns remain absent: cryptographic binding prevents false

credit but cannot create the missing subjective evidence.

  1. High — reviewer independence is externally governed: hashes and counts do

not prove identity, qualifications, or independence.

  1. Medium — latest-path replacement remains operationally sensitive: the

registered chain must be regenerated together when a packet changes.

Actions

| Owner | Action and acceptance criteria | Validation |

|---|---|---|

| Editorial Research | Return two completed forms for one unchanged registered packet | Private responses bind the readiness packet hash |

| AI Evaluation | Aggregate without editing packet, key, or response exports | Public receipt replays through the complete chain |

| Trust | Verify reviewer independence and accept evidence separately | No artifact grants acceptance or deployment authority |

| Maintainers | Regenerate assignment/readiness together after packet changes | Wrong-packet mutation remains fail-closed |

Next-cycle hypothesis

The prepared Clio evidence-hook v6 packet can obtain two genuine blinded returns

without any handoff regeneration, producing the first chain-valid subjective

receipt. Its quality, protected-dimension, and effort gates remain unproven until

those returns exist.

Downstream outcome

Candidate-comparison evaluation now calls the same exported chain verifier used

by readiness. An end-to-end CLI mutation proves a valid same-surface receipt with

the wrong packet hash is rejected before output; the exact registered packet is

accepted without retaining the private input path or observations.